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Hunger for Being Born Completely.
Plasticity and Desire
The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process 
does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped 
by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own 
self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed 
by desire, meant as “hunger for being born completely” (Zambrano). The human 
being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such a 
hunger that directs the human positioning into the world.
I. Plasticity and formation (Bildung)
German phenomenologist Max Scheler (1874-1928) and Spanish philosopher 
María Zambrano (1904-1991) provided the fertile insight that the human being 
comes into the world without having been born completely and therefore lacks a 
definite form. The very fact of having come into existence without being fully born 
bestows a unique plasticity on the human formation process. In the following 
article I pursue further this idea and argue that desire, understood as the hunger 
for being born completely, is what orients this particular type of plasticity.1
Nowadays, “synaptic plasticity” is a core concept of neuroscience.2 From an 
interdisciplinary viewpoint the progress concerning “synaptic plasticity” achieved 
in neuroscience has a crucial impact on the philosophical reflection regarding the 
human being and does not necessarily adopt a reductionist perspective. The concept 
of plasticity already made its appearance in Goethe’s thoughts on the organism. In 
the second volume of his Schriften zur Morphologie [1824], Goethe explains that 
the nature of an organism is not confined to an essence or an immutable shape 
(Bild, Gestalt), but is characterized by a dynamic process of formation (Bildung), 
1 This work summarizes some views expressed in G. Cusinato’s Periagoge. Teoria della 
singolarità e filosofia come esercizio di formazione, QuiEdit, Verona 2014 (II ed. 2017).
2 J. LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, New York, Penguin 
Books, 2002; E. R. Kandel, In Search of Memory. The Emergence of a New Science of Mind, New 
York 2006.
66 GUIDO CUSINATO     Philosophical News
which he interprets as a transformation (Umbildung).3 Before Goethe, the process 
of formation had generally meant the capacity to passively take on any shape, in the 
same way as clay can be molded into the shape of a vase. Goethe points out that in 
the living being a formation process takes place which does not consist in passively 
receiving a form already present in the world of ideas, but rather in creating a new 
shape: nature forms something, not in the sense of bestowing an already given 
shape, but in that of creating ever new forms. In this concept of plasticity the 
emphasis is not so much on one’s capacity of adapting in order to receive a shape 
but rather on an organism’s creativeness.
In order to convey this difference, I will refer to the terms “change” and 
“transformation”: 1) by plasticity as change, I mean one’s capacity to acquire a new 
shape due to an external pressure or in order to adapt to the external environment. 
4It may be the plasticity of a malleable piece of clay, the plasticity of an elastic 
material that recovers its initial shape when the external pressures have ceased, the 
mimetic plasticity of a chameleon or of an individual opportunistically adapting to 
a specific environment. 2) By plasticity as transformation, I mean the capacity of 
an organic, social or personal system to increase in its complexity in a specific way: 
in this case, the change in the equilibrium of one’s own system or the distancing 
from oneself gives way to the birth of a new shape, that is to say, a new process of 
formation in the sense of a development, growth or blossom. 
An extraordinary plasticity of the second type characterizes the process of 
human formation, and in this sort of plasticity the explicit element does not lie in 
the capacity to passively receive a shape, but rather in that of creating and bringing 
new shapes to life. Our individuality and singularity, as well as the development of 
our personality, are comprehensible precisely in relation to this creative plasticity.
II. Emotional social brain and emotional sharing
In this paper, I intend to investigate the creative plasticity of the human formation 
in relation to what is called “desire”. Desire is desire for alterity. A desiring person 
directly experiences the reality of not being self-sufficient. Are desire for the 
Other, lack of self-sufficiency and the extreme complexity of human plasticity 
interconnected? It would be simplistic to think that the creative plasticity of the 
human formation process (Bildung) could be traced back to the synaptic plasticity 
of a single brain; the experience of desire for the Other would rather suggest that 
the plasticity of the human formation is connected to something very similar to an 
“emotional social brain”. I argue that such a trans-subjective dimension of human 
formation is the specific result of social practices of emotional sharing.5 What an 
3 W. Goethe, Schriften zur Morphologie II, in Gesamtausgabe der Werke und Schriften, 
Bd. XIX, Cotta’sche Buchhandlung, Stuttgart 1959.
4 C. Malabou, Plasticité, Éditions Léo Scheer, Paris 1999.
5 G. Cusinato, Care and Birth. Emotional Sharing as the Foundation of Care Relationships, 
in S. Bourgault & E. Pulcini (eds.), Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Peeters, 
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individual is or may become largely depends on how she experiences the sharing 
of emotions underlying the social sphere through practices that do not only involve 
the people who are closest to her, but also the interaction with the entire cultural 
and aesthetic dimension, including for instance books and works of art.  I suggest 
including these various concepts under the expression “exemplary testimony” and 
I am convinced that it is possible to develop a phenomenology of the maieutic 
testimony that is capable of positively or negatively affecting our plastic process 
of formation. 
Iii. Will of intellect and will of feeling
When trying to address the concept of plasticity in philosophical terms, one of 
the first problems that arise is that of the relationship between plasticity and will: 
plasticity would thus be the “elastic” effect produced by the will’s action on the 
human being. Below is my attempt to develop a different hypothesis. What do we 
mean by will? In Western philosophy, the will has often been traced back to the 
intellect and opposed to feeling as well as to the entire affective sphere. Kant’s 
position is in this respect emblematic, detecting in “pure will” a means to “correct” 
the affective sphere by submitting it to the ideal ought-to-be. Kant’s thesis may 
be countered with Spinoza’s view, who observed that the will cannot act upon 
affections, since an “emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another 
emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion”.6
Kant’s reasoning is founded on the idea that ethics can only be based on pure 
will, or else it would be at the mercy of yearnings and impulses. This idea lies on 
the assumption that the affective sphere is a confused and disarranged entity 
governed by obscure drives. It follows that the existence of an order of feeling, 
desire and love, independent of both the drives and the intellect, is ruled out a 
priori. By applying the concept of intentionality to the emotional sphere, Brentano 
and the German phenomenology would later head in a different direction. But 
if we admit an intentional affective sphere separate from the drives and the 
intellect, how would it relate to the will? Do intentional feeling, desire or love have 
their own specific form of “will”?
If we admit a will of the intentional feeling, for the entire ethics a new perspective 
opens up, because it would undermine: 1) Spinoza’s objection against the will of the 
intellect – the will of intentional feeling would actually be able to affect emotions; 
and 2) Kant’s objection regarding the role of the affective sphere in ethics – the 
intentionality of feeling would not have the same direction as cravings and drives.
In Western culture the question of a will belonging to feeling has been dismissed 
almost entirely. Among the few exceptions Augustine deserves special mention. In 
Leuven/Paris/Bristol (CT) 2018, 137-165.
6 «Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem 
affectu coercendo» (Spinoza, Ethica, IV, propositio 7).
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his Confessions he describes a “good will” that, like a “weight”, draws us to a place 
where we find our peace,7 and actually converges with desire and love.
iV. The ought-to-be (Sollen) and the heart’s restlessness
When I look deep enough within myself, I inevitably perceive an original tension. 
What is it? Is it due to the distance I feel between what I am and what I ought to 
be in the Kantian sense? I don’t think so. According to Kant, the ought-to-be is 
achieved res objecti by a pure will that demands, res subjecti, the individual’s consent 
(Beistimmung). If I question myself, I discover something very different going on 
inside of me. The original tension I perceive and that underlies my existence is not 
due to a rift between my being (Sein) and what I ideally ought to be (Sollen), but rather 
to a conflict between my desire and my self-referential being. This tension cannot be 
traced back to some “heroic” will of the intellect, aiming at filling the gap between 
finitude and that which ideally ought to be, but rather to a certain restlessness of the 
heart, a feeling of boredom, disgust and dissatisfaction with the discrepancy between 
my desire and the limits of my selfish and self-referential “narrow self”. The starting 
point is not the distance between my actual being and what I ideally ought to be, but 
the discord between my desire and my self-centeredness.
V. Desire and lack
Kant pictures the human as “crooked timber” that the pure will tries to straighten 
out according to what it ought to be, but never succeeds completely.8 What he 
proposes is an “orthopedic” scheme. Human beings are faulty and lacking and for 
this reason they try to conform to an ideal, unattainable and utterly transcendent 
“ought-to-be”. The relationship between desire and lack has also often been 
traced back to this scheme: desire is interpreted as the perception of lack, the 
fulfillment of which is assigned to a level of the Absolute or the Infinite that goes 
beyond this world. Just like the ought-to-be, this ideal level exerts an orthopedic 
function, straightening the individual’s imperfect being. From this perspective, 
desire is inevitably turned into a moralizing and moralistic repressive force. This 
argument has been criticized Deleuze and Guattari, leaning on the assertion of 
Clément Rosset:
The world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the 
following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the 
7 Augustine, Conf. XIII, 9,10
8 «Aus so krummem Holz, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz 
gezimmert werden» (I. Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 
Gesammelte Schriften, hg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 
1902ff, Akademie Ausgabe VIII, 23).
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world does not contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one object 
missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place that 
can cure desire (not in this world).9
The conclusion of their reasoning, however, should be revised: “some other 
place that can cure desire” is to be found beyond our self-referential “narrow 
selves”, but still in this empirical world. One may concede that desire acquires 
a positive value when it is considered to be independent from lack. Still, such 
a positive value appears to be subject to the will to power of the self-referential 
“narrow self”. By eliminating this lack, desire becomes a conformist justification 
of the existent. It introduces a conformist change, not a creative transformation. 
By excluding the relationship between desire and lack, philosophy turns into a 
philosophy of the status quo, turning desire into the mere affirmation of the subject 
or a reverberation of compulsive enjoyment.
Would a different relationship between desire and lack be conceivable? One 
possible hypothesis can be that the lack perceived by desire does not refer to 
any transcendent being lying beyond the world and experience, but rather to 
something beyond my self-referential egocentrism, as well as beyond the sheer 
factuality that is determined by a prevailing common sense and common feeling. 
Such a type of lack do not refer to an ideal or transcendent world, but is embedded 
in an immanent dimension, enhancing a positive transformation of this world and 
of this reality. This lack – which should not be interpreted as a vacuum to fulfill 
but as a source of the hunger for being born – entails a creative conception of 
plasticity: desire does not aim at complying with the form of a want that is pre-
given in the world of ideas, or of the ought-to-be. Instead, it becomes the highest 
form of creative plasticity insofar as it aims at creating a new form for this lack.
The creative perspective of a plastic transformation allows us to avoid the usual 
series of solutions that have traditionally been used to explain the relationship 
between desire and lack. This does not concern what Hegel described as a 
“negation of the negation”, nor some sort of nostalgia for something from the 
past. The word “nostalgia” is composed of the Greek terms nostos (return) and 
algos (pain): it is the pain that urges us to return to our origins, to Ulysses’ Ithaca, 
or to reunite with our missing half in order to restore an original and complete 
unity, according to Aristophanes’ myth of the Androgynous refuted by Socrates in 
Plato’s Symposium.
These interpretations lie on the assumption that desire seeks something that is 
lacking in order to complete and strengthen what already is, according to a pre-
defined project. Instead, desire experiences lack as an impulse to create something 
that is beyond itself, in the absence of any pre-given fixed solution scheme. Desire 
has no future and ideal goal. Insofar as it is not the realization of an idea ante res 
nor the execution of an algorithm, desire is not a sort of teleologism, nor does it 
9 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Penguin 2009 
(1972), p. 26. Deleuze and Guattari refer to Rosset’s Logique du pire (1970).
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aim at fulfilling this lack in the same way as an architect would realize the project 
of a bridge. But rather, lack drives desire to create something without knowing 
beforehand what form it should have.
So what is desire? It is the craving for an encounter with the Other. In and by 
the search for this encounter my existence takes shape plastically. To be faithful to 
one’s desire does not entail the achievement of some pre-given goal, but rather 
the rebirth in one’s encounter with the Other and the inauguration of a new 
and still unknown beginning. When I desire, I am not searching for my missing 
half in order to restore a self-sufficient and independent unity, but instead I am 
attempting to move out of my self-referential “narrow self” and to attain the 
perspective of my “cosmic self”.
VI. Desire as the quest for a new constellation
The Latin verb “desiderare” (desire) is composed of the particle “de” – denoting 
a lack, or a destructive action10 – and the term sidus, sideris (pl. sidera), meaning 
“star”. Thus, desire could correspond to the feeling one has when sensing a “lack 
of the stars” – that is not the lack of one star, but rather, of a cluster of stars. Now, it 
is widely acknowledged that, since antiquity, stars were assembled in constellations 
in order to decipher the starry sky. And constellations were used for the purpose of 
orientation, for instance in marine navigation. Furthermore, desire expresses two 
different meanings according to how the particle “de” is interpreted: 1) as the feeling 
of a “lack of constellations”, that is to say, of orientation parameters – accepting 
this, desire would denote a nostalgia for points of reference that are missing; 2) 
the attempt to destroy (“de-”) the constellation of stars (“sidera”) that limit my 
existence, determining my destiny. In this second case, I do not feel any nostalgia 
for the constellation that oriented my existence in the past and that I no longer see, 
because it might be hidden behind some clouds. Instead, I feel deeply dissatisfied 
with the constellation that orients me and this incites me to move away from it 
in search of a new constellation that I cannot see yet. Desire is associated with a 
feeling of dissatisfaction towards my present destiny (the constellation that guided 
my hitherto existence), which is deconstructed in order to begin my quest for a new 
constellation, a new beginning to my existence. By abandoning the constellation 
that oriented it, I actually allow my existence to literally run off the rails of fatalism. 
VII. The power of testimony
What is it that orients desire in its quest for a new constellation? I suggest that 
desire is not directed by the will of the intellect, but rather by emotional-sharing 
10 In the verb “to de-construct” the particle “de-” denotes the action of undoing or negating 
a certain construct or structure.
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practices oriented by the power of negative or positive maieutic testimonies. An 
individual offers a positive example when her existence develops without causing 
envy, and a negative one whenever her existence withers and implodes. From this 
perspective, the power of testimony is the cornerstone of an alternative ethics to 
that of Kant which is based on the categorical imperative. The power of testimony 
guides us maieutically to both an emotional and a reflective transformation. From 
now on, I will only focus on the former aspect. 
The logic of maieutic testimony is phenomenologically different from that of the 
social model. The more universal a model is, the more it makes everyone equal, 
while the more universal a maieutic testimony is, the more it singularizes every 
individual it affects, provoking in each one of them a unique and original outcome.
Associated with the signs of success and social standing, a social model exerts a 
form of attraction that is not immune from the dynamics of resentment and envy. 
Instead, the positive testimony is in some way mysterious: it occurs whenever I 
realize that before another person’s flourishing existence I do not feel envy, but 
indeed admiration or even gratitude.
What probably takes place in these cases is something similar to what occurs 
when I water the rose bush on my balcony: I do not water my flowers in expectation 
of obtaining something material in return, although I must admit that it is not a 
completely disinterested gesture either. Why do I care so much that the roses on my 
windowsill flourish instead of them wilting? The fact that those roses flourish thanks 
to my ministrations makes me happy; or rather, feeling that my care helps the roses 
blossom makes me feel more alive: it gives me a tiny confirmation of the fact that I 
am living. This feeling might be much greater if I was taking care of another person. 
VIii. Hunger for being born completely
As I have already pointed out, the concept of plasticity has two main meanings: 
the capacity of receiving a pre-given shape and the capacity of initiating a new 
and still non-existing form. In the first case we have a model, that operates like 
a mold shaping my formation, and in the second case a maieutic testimony, 
which should not be understood as a pre-given form to be imitated, but rather 
as the maieutic space that enables me to create a new shape. Encountering a 
positive testimony, I access a space where I am able to continue my coming into 
existence. I could not find such a space in the limited horizon of my “narrow self”. 
This explains why the maieutic testimony helps one to exceed the logic of envy, 
considered to be one of the main causes of human unhappiness.11 In the case of 
positive testimony, the other person’s flourishing is not perceived as “robbing” my 
own existence, but on the contrary it becomes the indispensable condition of my 
own flourishing.
11 On the relationship between envy and unhappiness, see B. Russel, The Conquest of 
Happiness, Liveright Pub Corp 2013 (1930), Chapter VI.
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But why is the human being characterized by such an intense form of creative 
plasticity? After leaving the maternal womb, the human being is confronted 
with the problem of being born again in the encounter with the Other through 
emotional-sharing practices. Coming into the world without having finished 
being born, the human being feels a true “hunger for being born completely”.12 
The hunger for being born is the first elementary form from which the order of my 
feeling constantly configures and reconfigures. As a singular being, I am the order 
of my feeling (my ordo amoris): by establishing an order of relevance and priority, 
it allows me to position myself within the world, to build relationships with others, 
to act, to experience, to perceive and to know – in short, to exist. By experiencing 
the pangs of this craving for being born, I realize that my feeling as well as the 
way in which I experience things constitutes the very processes through which 
the further birth of my existence takes place. The hunger for being born entirely 
is the desire that orients the maieutic testimony, just like the longing for social 
recognition orients the social model. 
IX. Ratcliffe: “Feelings of being”
Feelings of Being by Matthew Ratcliffe is one of the most significant texts 
on emotions written in the last years.13 According to Ratcliffe, the recent 
philosophical debate has focused too much on the concept of “emotion” thus 
overlooking the field of “existential feelings”, that Ratcliffe primarily conceives 
of in terms of “mood” and characterizes as “finding ourselves in the world”. The 
particularity of Ratcliffe’s thesis lies in the fact that he tries to demonstrate that in 
the structure of these “existential feelings”, the bodily dimension coexists with an 
intentional structure directed towards the world. Thus, Ratcliffe suggests that we 
resort to “existential feelings” in order to refuse Damasio’s distinction between 
“background feelings” – referring to the bodily condition (i.e. a bodily comfort or 
discomfort) and understood as “body states rather than emotional states” – and 
emotions oriented towards an object in the world. “Existential feelings” are rather 
bodily feelings that constitute the “background relations to the world”, that is to 
say, the predominant background atmosphere that directs one’s relationship to the 
world and from which the very feeling of being in the world emerges.
I hold that the intention underlying this theory – an attempt to draw our 
attention to the pre-reflexive emotional breakthrough in which our very positioning 
in the world and our sense of reality are rooted – is correct. Yet, Ratcliffe fails 
to distinguish between environment (Umwelt) and world (Welt). It is essential 
that the last remnants of the dualism between living body (Leib) and mind are 
12 I quote Spanish philosopher María Zambrano’s enlightening expression: “hambre de 
nacer del todo” (see M. Zambrano, Hacia un saber sobre el alma, Alianza, Madrid 2000).
13 M. Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being. Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.
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removed: we are our living body, interactively related with the expressive field of 
life. Furthermore, our way of positioning ourselves in the world is grounded on the 
feeling of our living body. Nonetheless, the living body’s feeling is not an indistinct 
whole, but rather it articulates itself on different intentional levels. Modesty is also 
a feeling of the living body: it would in fact be impossible to conceive of it without 
referring immediately and directly to the living body, and it appears physically 
through the typical blush on one’s cheek. Nevertheless, modesty bears a form of 
intentionality that we must carefully distinguish from the pre-intentionality of an 
itching hand or a toothache. Strictly speaking, organic sensations are directed 
towards an interaction with the environment: in no way does the sensation of 
itching due to a mosquito’s bite or a toothache prepare one’s positioning in a 
condition of openness to the world (Weltoffenheit meaning both the act of opening 
up to the world and an opening up of the world to me), but only my positioning in 
an environment or ecological niche (Umwelt). Complex feelings such as modesty 
or respect for the Other allow us to access reality in a way that is different from the 
access to reality made possible by the organic sensation of itching: these are two 
independent, although complementary, ways of accessing reality.
In a later work, Ratcliffe suggests that we understand these affective tonalities 
or “moods” as the elements “that constitute the meaning of life”.14 Ratcliffe’s 
concept of “mood” is a reformulation of Heidegger’s theory of affective tonalities 
(“Stimmungen”). How should these predominant background undertones be 
understood when, according to Ratcliffe, they pre-intentionally orient one’s 
relationship to the world and from which one’s feeling of being in the world 
emerges? Should we imagine them as ontological invariables, exceeding the 
historical dimension, or should they more simply be identified as common sense, 
or what Blankenburg called the “natural evidence”?15 And if they are traced back 
to common sense, why should we consider them to be primary rather than social 
constructs? Ultimately, is it really possible to establish “the meaning of life” on the 
grounds of simple moods?
As a matter of fact, Ratcliffe interprets Heidegger’s affective tonalities in the 
sense offered by Scheler, namely as that which boosts intentionality towards 
openness to/of the world (Weltoffenheit). In Scheler, however, Weltoffenheit refers 
to an order of intentional feeling (ordo amoris) that is different from the impulsive 
order (Triebstruktur) of bodily feelings, which is instead intentionally oriented to 
interacting with the environment (Umwelt).
Human beings do not merely feel that they are in the world, but rather they are 
led to position themselves in the world by their own constitutional incompleteness, 
that is to say, by the fact that they have not yet finished being born, or as Zambrano 
would say, by their actual “hunger for being born completely”.
14 M. Ratcliffe, The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, edited by Peter Goldie, Oxford 2009, 353.
15 W. Blankenburg, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit. Ein Beitrag zur 
Psychopathologie symptomarmer Schizophrenien, Parodos, Berlin 2012 [1967].
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X. Moods and intentional feelings
Besides Ratcliffe’s theory, one may ask whether it is possible to found one’s 
positioning in the world and the meaning of life in what is designated as a general 
pre-intentional state of mind or mood, and whether such a mood could play a 
role in orienting this positioning. The “hunger for being born completely”, as 
well as the bodily feelings of the body schema, marks a clear distinction between 
the level of “moods” and the one of intentional feeling. I suggest that only an 
intentional feeling, and not a generic mood, is capable of orienting a person in 
her positioning in the world. Giving some practical examples: a generic mood 
like depression or apathy is different from the sadness I might feel after arguing 
with a friend. Similarly, a generic mood of euphoria is different from the feeling 
of joy caused by the receipt of good news. Moods and affective tonalities are 
“intentionally” oriented in a very general way to the world. The very fact that a 
mood is experienced as an unwarranted state is the reason why I ask myself what 
is happening within me, and I am often annoyed by my incapacity to understand 
how such a confused mood relates to the way I exist and feel. Properly speaking, 
at this level there is no such thing as an intentionality towards one’s positioning in 
the world yet. Actually, a mood is metabolized by emotions, sometimes supported 
by reflection, thus receiving a meaning that directs it with regard to the way I exist, 
as well as an intentionality as regards my process of formation and my positioning. 
Emotions are human beings’ most important anthropogenetic devices in that they 
metabolize moods into existential positioning. 
Our positioning in the world is not rooted in moods: even a mood such as the 
sheer feeling of being in the world is only the posthumous result of a positioning that 
has already taken place and therefore appears to be obvious. Moods are incapable 
of producing one’s positioning in the world and any “residual” intentionality we 
may find in them is only the effect of an intentionality that lies in the common sense 
and the common feeling in which they happen to be immersed. Any argument that 
resorts to the mood of being in the world in order to demonstrate one’s positioning 
in the world is either tautological or relapses to a petitio principii. This ambiguity 
is due to the fact that we mistake our feeling of being in the world, which is still 
immersed in natural evidence of common sense and common feeling, for the 
origin of our positioning in the world. But common sense evidence is, in its turn, a 
cultural product: in order to attain such an evidence, one’s positioning must have 
already taken place. When I feel that I am in the world, I am not in a situation that 
precedes my positioning in the world, but rather, without realizing it, I am already 
immersed in the positioning of natural evidence. I am not aware of this positioning 
because it is taken for granted in the social environment I live in.
As Blankenburg, for instance, points out, the schizophrenic lives at the mercy of 
moods or attitudes that are incapable of referring to any “invisible” (i.e. obvious, or 
taken for granted) positioning of natural evidence.16 Insofar as this individual only 
16 Ibidem.
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refers to such moods, he is incapable of accessing the world and interacting with 
the expressive level of the Other. In order to feel that we are in the world, we first 
need to position ourselves through our encounter with the Other. 
XI. Emotions and metabolizing moods into feelings
Words like “moods”, “emotions” and “feelings” are often confused. By “emotions” 
I mean what orients an organism’s or a person’s positioning within reality. Here 
I will restrict my analysis to those emotions that orient a person’s positioning. 
At this level, I understand an “emotion” to be what allows a person to position 
themselves in the world by metabolizing their moods into feelings.
Again, I will try to make myself clear by resorting to a practical example. When I 
am in a bad mood, I often experience this situation as one in which I am incapable 
of relating this perturbed state to my way of existing and feeling. I perceive this 
mood as something unwarranted and precisely for this reason I examine what is 
going on inside of me. How many times have we happened to be in a bad mood 
without knowing the reason, and even having the impression that there is no 
reason for it? In a way, in these cases, I am suspended in an indefinite situation as if 
I were not able to understand how to position myself in the world and to assume 
a clearly-justified position towards others.
These chaotic moods are metabolized by a person’s emotions into that person’s 
very positioning in the world. Thus, emotions give a direction to these moods 
with respect to one’s individual way of existing, as well as an intentionality with 
regard to one’s formation process. Initially, I may feel in a bad mood and even 
upset because I see no reason for it. Such disposition urges me to understand 
my situation better and after a few hours I may realize that I am in a bad mood 
because a friend of mine had not replied to my email the day before. Emotion 
turns this awareness, that is attained at the reflective level, in a transformation 
of my affective sphere. At that point, a generic mood turns into a positioning, 
for instance a feeling of anger or sadness. If this process does not take place, 
the person remains at the mercy of her own moods and dispositions, incapable 
of accessing the world and interacting with others on the expressive level, and 
ultimately unable to be in touch with her own self. 
The fact that emotions metabolize moods into feelings by interacting with a 
particular person’s formation process is the crucial point. In my opinion, when I 
metabolize a generic bad mood into a particular form of sadness, I am actually 
giving shape to my singularity: the distinct feature of my personality may be 
detected in the way in which I express my sadness. 
Feelings are moods that are shaped by relating them to an individual’s order of 
feeling (in the sense of an ordo amoris)17. What happens when I get emotional? If I 
17 Cfr. M. Scheler, Ordo amoris, in Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David R. 
Lachterman, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, 103-104.
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think about it, my answer would be that, when I am moved by something, I come 
into contact with something unexpected and I feel as though I do not have the 
adequate ready-made answers to this new challenge. In a certain sense, at first my 
emotions confuse me and leave me without answers. Afterwards, though, they urge 
me to re-orient myself. From this perspective, emotions may be conceived of as 
the “laboratory” in which one invents new affective responses. The metabolizing 
process taking place in this emotional “laboratory” is extremely complex and 
concerns the deepest core of our freedom and personality. At this stage, not only 
do I orient and bestow a form of intentionality upon my moods, but I also re-
orient my feelings and my previous order of feeling in order to fit in better the new 
situation I am experiencing. When this process occurs repeatedly bringing about 
similar affective responses, a disposition, that is to say, a feeling is formed.
XII. The order of feeling
Before drawing to a conclusion, I would like to avoid a serious misunderstanding: 
through the concept of order of feeling my aim is not to re-propose some sort of 
paternalistic or moralistic viewpoint. In Western culture, drives, feelings, emotions 
and desire have often been considered to be an unreliable and chaotic material 
which needs to be “straightened out” by referring either to the world of ideas 
(platonic idealism) or to the ought-to-be (Kant). In 1972, Deleuze and Guattari 
developed a different hypothesis. In their book Anti-Oedipus, they suggested that 
drives should be unrestrained. In both cases, the possibility of an “order of feeling” 
is not taken into account. The idea of an “order” of feeling is problematic if such 
“order” is imposed to feeling from above, but not when this order arises from feeling 
itself. This idea may well appear bizarre, since we are used to think of the concept 
of “order” as something that is imposed from by thought or by will. Instead, the 
concept of order of feeling allows us to eliminate the opposition between feeling and 
thinking that characterizes most of Western thought. Besides, what does “thinking” 
mean? Is not thinking also, in some respect, the act of feeling a feeling?
A further objection could be that, if this order stems from feeling, then it would 
surely be a “subjective”, “arbitrary”, “irrational” and “vitalistic” order. This 
objection lies on the arguable assumption that life and the irrational are equivalent. 
One could instead concede that such an order of feeling is neither “irrational” nor 
“subjective”, being based on the capacity of each living organism to relate and 
attune with life’s expressive level through “emotional sharing” practices, which are 
neither arbitrary nor subjective.
XIii. Conclusion: Desire and birth
The human being comes into the world without having been born completely. 
This means that our formation process is not pre-determined and is extremely 
plastic. Its plasticity should not be interpreted as a change, conveying a form and 
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direction to it, but rather as a transformation through which a person’s feature 
and singularity is gradually brought forth in a dynamic order of feeling. When 
I metabolize a generic bad mood in a particular form of sadness, I am actually 
expressing and giving shape to my singularity, which occurs in the interaction 
of affective, reflective and hermeneutic levels. This is not an isolated and self-
sufficient process, but the further continuation of my own birth in the encounter 
with the Other. Having come into the world without having yet finished being 
born, the human being literally feels a “hunger for being born completely”. And 
this hunger is desire, which does not mean the perception of a lack in this empirical 
world, that refers to an ideal and transcendent world, but the awareness that the 
self-referential perspective of one’s “narrow self” is insufficient and limited. The 
constitutive incompleteness of human being, that is to say, desire understood as 
“hunger for being born completely” in the encounter with the Other, is what 
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